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Our second main assumption was that there should be a positive linear relationship between action-inaction ratings and valuation ratings. The average ratings were therefore regressed based on the definition ratings for refusal to act and indicated a strong positive relationship: b = 0.628 t(85) = 7.613, p < 0.001, which corresponds to 41% of the variance shared by the average action, inaction and evaluation ratings. We calculated the means for the definition of action-inaction and the evaluation ratings for each word (see Figures 1 and 2.2, respectively). All behaviors and states were coded for word frequency and kept constant for each analysis (definition and valence). To determine whether the data reflected our socially shared assumption, we used polynomial adjustment of standard deviations that regressed to definition means (see Figure 3). According to our hypothesis, words that are classified as clearly inactive or active (extreme means) should be less variable (smaller SDs), which can be tested via the incremental variance part of the quadratic tendency over the linear trend as well as the weight of the square component in the quadratic polynomial. The data supported our hypothesis: incremental R2 = 0.343 (0.579 vs.236), F(1, 84) = 68,304, p <.001 and regression weight for square component b = -0.112, t(84) = −8,265, p <.001. That is, the extreme examples of action and inaction had greater variability than the moderate examples. Today I will speak at length about another such case: the case where inaction is an act. In line with our predictions, the preference for action (vs. inaction) was correlated with the need for locomotion and the need for closure. These moderate associations indicate discriminatory constructions that are nevertheless linked. We believe these relationships suggest that people who seek a quick fix to uncertainty and are goal-oriented benefit from preference for action because actions are more likely to indicate progress.

For example, finding a quick solution to a problem allows a person to move on. This “continuation” is based more on the construction of action than on inaction. The locomotion scale is designed to measure commitment to initiate and maintain targeted activities, often overcoming possible distractions and difficulties in the process (Kruglanski et al., 2000). Examples of locomotion elements include “I feel excited just before reaching a goal” and “I don`t mind doing things, even if they require extra effort.” Participants were asked to rate the extent to which each statement personally described them on a 5-point scale from 1 (not at all characteristic of me) to 5 (extremely characteristic of me). On average, the elements had a Cronbach alpha of 0.88. The words used in this study come from a list created by an independent sample of eighty students who provided words related to action and inaction. This former group of students sat in a classroom and received a piece of paper with instructions to generate examples of specific concepts/words. They were specifically asked to list examples that immediately came to mind when they read a particular concept or word. An example illustrated how the concept/word fruit could evoke the apple first, then the pear, and asked students to write the examples in the order in which they came to mind (p.

e.g., apple, pear). The rest of the sheet listed the action or non-action and contained ten locations under the concept labeled 1 through 10 in ascending order. Participants learned that they didn`t have to fill in all the examples and that they could stop when they started fighting. We looked at each generated word and selected the 88 concepts/words that consisted of a single word. These individual words were of a different nature, as some words referred to clearly definable behaviors (e.g., verbs such as kicking), while other words referred to physical or mental states (e.g., adjectives such as tired, calm). Finally, participants were interviewed in detail and thanked for their participation. Do people agree on what constitutes action and what constitutes inaction? Does action shed a more positive light than inaction? In this research, we tried to answer these questions and examine individual and cultural differences in the evaluation of action and inaction. Our results supported the idea that people define action and non-action on a continuum and that the ends of the poles represent socially shared concepts. In addition, we found that Christian beliefs, locomotion, and the need for closure play a role in the preference or positivity of action. In the field of culture, more work could be done to determine how cultures differ in naïve definitions and assessments of action and inaction. Self-constructing styles of interdependence and independence (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) can interact with action to promote a higher level of collective action when cultures are elevated both in interdependence and preference for action, but a higher level of individual action when cultures are elevated to independence and preference for action.

Perhaps people with an interdependent construction prefer to act (rather than inaction) only if it is associated with an acting capacity that promotes the well-being of the group (Kitayama & Uchida, 2005). In Study 4, we wanted to reproduce the existence of preference for action as an individual difference using a multi-element scale and test our hypothesis of a link between preference for action and Christian religious beliefs. We assessed these beliefs to determine whether preference for action is positively correlated with Christian religious beliefs. The cohesion of a society depends, in part, on how its individual members manage their day-to-day activities in relation to the objectives of that society. Therefore, there should be some degree of social agreement on what constitutes action and what constitutes inaction. This research examined the structure of the definitions of action and inaction, the evaluation of action versus inaction, and the individual differences in these assessments. Action-inaction assessments of behaviors and states have shown more social agreement at the ends of the continuum in action than in the middle, suggesting a socially divided interpretation of this definition. It has also been shown that action inaction ratings correlate with the valence of the noted behaviors, so the more active the behavior, the more positive its valence.

Finally, individual differences in transportation, the need for a degree, and Christian religious beliefs were positively correlated with a preference for action. An important cultural difference that is shown here to correlate with preference for action is adherence to Christian beliefs. In addition, some types of cultures encourage individual members of the culture to act personally in response to life circumstances, while other types of cultures encourage a more passive and accommodating approach to life events. For example, facial cultures (e.g., Many East Asian cultures) members remain inactive in response to confrontations and troubling life events, while honor cultures (e.g., the southern United States) encourage members to actively engage in disruptive events (Cohen and Leung, 2011). Although the implications of these cultural attitudes towards action and inaction goals have not yet been explicitly tested, people who are part of a religion or culture that prescribes actions at the expense of inaction should likely pursue action goals more frequently and intensely than inaction goals. A strong correlation was obtained between the two preferences for action points (“For me, action is more important than inaction” and “For me, action is always better than inaction”), r = 0.67, p < 0.001. An average score of these two elements has been used in other analyses as an indication of individual differences in action preference (versus inaction). The mean preference score for action (versus inaction) was 5.18, SD = 1.43, with a 95% confidence interval of 3.06 to 5.42. In addition, the mean value of 5.18 was significantly higher than the neutral point value of the scale, t(136) = 15.68, p <.001. As a result, we found that evaluations of measures were more positive than evaluations of inaction.

This discovery complements the results of our first two studies. In our first study, we found evidence of our hypothesis of a socially shared sense of action and inaction, so that there was more agreement at the poles of the continuum in action than at the middle of the continuum. In other words, there was less variability in assessing behaviours like running (an extreme case of action) or sleep (an extreme case of inaction) than behaviours like judges.