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The training and experience that an individual lawyer follows to prepare for the bailiff try to free himself from this human condition and make him an objective thinker. The quality abstract society that seeks to mediate lawyers and judges is called “cognitive” decision-making. Most people are usually “emotional” thinkers. It simply means that most people use the right side of their brain to make decisions. These people tend to be emotional, creative, and more interested in people than in legal issues. They often view hearings and trials as human dramas rather than abstract issues. Cognitive thinkers, on the other hand, are supposed to argue with the left side of their brains. This thinker is more interested in abstract topics that people like to wait for and doesn`t decide until all the evidence is available, and uses inductive thinking to make a possible logical decision. That being said, no one is completely “cognitive” or “affective”; Rather, each person is a combination of both, and a continuum is likely to be a better perspective than a strict “somehow” response to the type of thinker that a particular person is.

For obvious reasons, most judges tend to be more cognitive thinkers; However, it is also a question of degree. Each judge has a different mix of the two types of thought patterns and can be influenced by a variety of factors when making a decision based on who they are. Just positivism is a separate issue from legal realism. The differences are significant both analytically and normatively. Both structures view the rule as a human creation. Positivists, unlike American legal realists, argue that in some situations, the law gives their problems and judges fairly definite instructions, at least in the courts. Niklas Luhmann concludes: “We can reduce positive law to a formula, the law is not only raised by judgment (i.e. selected), but it is also true by decision-making power (i.e. dependent and variable). Positivists, however, do not say that anyone`s judgment makes a law valid. According to Hart, the veracity of the law is a matter of the usual and collective processes of the court. As for the legal value of the law, it is a question of universal values that positivists and realists defend.

In this situation, “the power of judgment” has no important function, because individual judgments never serve to establish a collective norm of acceptance, so it would be implausible to believe that moral values are determined by someone in this way. Legal realism is a naturalistic philosophy of law. It is in the perspective that case law should imitate scientific methods, that is, rely on empirical evidence. Assumptions must be tested by overall results. Legal realists conclude that jurisprudence can analyze law exclusively through the worthless tools of the natural sciences, rather than through the metaphysical examination of the nature and purpose of law, which is distinct and distinct from law. In fact, legal realism states that the law cannot be isolated from its implementation and cannot be easily interpreted. This shows how important it is to recognize the considerations present in judicial decision-making by identifying the essence of the law in areas such as judicial decisions rendered by judges and their respect or rejection of the previous precedent and the doctrine of final judgment. Although the American legal realism movement first emerged in the 1920s as a cohesive intellectual force, it relied heavily on a number of earlier thinkers and was influenced by broader cultural forces. In the early years of the twentieth century, formalistic approaches to law had been heavily criticized by thinkers such as Roscoe Pound, John Chipman Gray, and Benjamin Cardozo.

Philosophers like John Dewey had supported empirical science as a model of all intelligent research, arguing that the law should be seen as a practical tool to promote human well-being. Outside the realm of law, in areas such as economics and history, there has been a “general revolt against formalism,” a reaction in favor of more empirical paths of philosophy and the humanities. [8] But by far the most important intellectual influence on legal realists was the thought of American jurist and Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. Legal realism was associated with American jurisprudence in the 1920s and 1930s, particularly among federal judges[1] and lawyers within the Roosevelt administration. Notable jurists associated with legal realism included Felix Cohen, Morris Cohen, Arthur Corbin, Walter Wheeler Cook, Robert Hale, Wesley Hohfeld, Karl Llewellyn, Underhill Moore, Herman Oliphant, and Warren Seavey,[1] many of whom were associated with Yale Law School. As Keith Bybee argues, “legal realism has exposed the role of politics in judicial decision-making, thus challenging conventional efforts to anchor the judiciary on a firm and impartial basis.” [2] Contemporary jurists working in the tradition of law and society have broadened the foundations of legal realism to postulate what has been called the new legal realism. As Hart explains in his theory, this completely ignores the idea that judges use laws to guide their decisions, rather than as evidence to determine their final judgments. Many critics have argued that realists have exaggerated the extent to which the law is “interspersed” with gaps, ambiguities, etc. The fact that most legal questions have simple and clear answers that no lawyer or judge would dispute is difficult to reconcile with the bold arguments of the realists of pervasive legal “vagueness.” Many writers, including Ronald Dworkin and Lon Fuller, have disappointed legal realists for their relentless efforts to distinguish between law and morality. Moral realists are at odds with the principles of natural law.

Legal realists argue that these cultures are historical and/or natural concepts and should be approached through a variety of psychological and sociocultural assumptions, with legal concepts perceived as determined by human behavior that should be evaluated empirically rather than by theoretical assumptions about the law.